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Introduction
This paper presents some of our work in using commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) secure coprocessors to enhance privacy and security of servers in general, and considering private information retrieval in particular. Section 1.1 sets the broad context of this research effort. Section 1.2 presents the enabling technology: high performance, high-assurance secure coprocessors. Section 1.3 presents the specific application problem of private information retrieval, in this context. Section 1.4 then presents the course of the rest of the paper.
Context of Research
Is there a practical way to systematically add privacy to real distributed information services?
This question has many aspects. To begin with, the World Wide Web is currently the pre-eminent medium for distributed information services. If we want to do something practical, it had better fit within this medium:
• using the existing client infrastructure;
• minimizing changes to current server infrastructure;
• maintaining reasonable server performance, at realistic workloads;
• and be deployable with currently existing, commonly available technology.
However, discussions of Web security and privacy usually focus on just a few areas: authentication of the server, encryption of the client-server traffic, and potential server use of cookies. These discussions overlook a more fundamental issue: participants in distributed Web services are forced to trust the integrity of the server-that it works as advertised, that it keeps private client data private, that it otherwise behaves correctly. Given that the current Web PKI establishes little more than server identity, and that the Web creates a global marketplace where clients may have no additional information about a server operator, these issues are critical. Stakeholders include
• clients, whose interests directly depend on these privacy and security properties of the server,
• as well as the server operators themselves, who may gain a competitive (or legal) advantage by being able to establish, with high assurance, that their service can be trusted-even though they may have motivation to subvert it.
As an extreme end-point, we say that a server is root-secure with respect to certain properties when an adversary (even with the equivalent of UNIX "root" privileges on the host) who cannot break some level of cryptography is not able to subvert them. We are interested in root-security for several reasons. First, it protects (maximally, by some metrics) the privacy of the user's actions: from the owners of the service, from hackers who may break into the service, from external parties who may compel the operator to provide inside access, and from adversaries who physically seize control of the machines. Additionally, by its maximal nature, root-security provides a level of privacy that may actually provide practical assurance-since history has shown that specifying weaker levels of security can open the door to unexpected compromise.
In broad strokes, then, much of our current research (e.g., [1, 2] ) focuses on:
• practical techniques (i.e., with minimal change to the current paradigm)
• to add root-security to privacy-critical server properties
• in such way that server operators of otherwise unknown credibility can prove this fact, with high-assurance.
The Enabling Technology
The secret weapon we bring to this family of problems is a high-performance secure coprocessor: a general-purpose computer that can be trusted to carry out its computation unmolested, even if the adversary has direct physical access to the device.
Yee's seminal work [3] demonstrated the potential of such devices. Smith and Weingart [4] showed how to build a generic secure coprocessor platform that third-party application developers could then transform into such specialpurpose devices. This research culminated in a family of commercially available devices [5] , which feature-in a PCI form factor-a general-purpose computing environment (99Mhz 486-class CPU, megabytes of memory), physical and logical security protection validated at FIPS 140-1 Level 4 [6] -as well as hardware 3DES and SHA, and a FIFO structure to allow fast data movement through these elements [7] .
Hardware The device provides a general-purpose computing environment for applications, with hardware support for cryptographic applications. However, the device also provides crucial security features:
• Continuously active tamper-detection circuitry monitors tamper detectors and, in case of physical attack, destroys sensitive secrets in secure memory before an adversary can access them.
• Hardware locks protect crucial code and secrets from possibly malicious or faulty application code, preserving the ability of each device to properly authenticate its configuration, and preventing a device with a rogue application from impersonating other devices and applications.
Software The IBM 4758 features a software architecture that permits application developers to install and update their applications into 4758 devices at customer sites, in such a way that protects the privacy and security interests of the developers, the customers, and IBM.
The Model 2 family of the IBM 4758 includes full support for outbound authentication, which enables on-board applications to, at run-time, authenticate their identity (and status as applications running on untampered hardware) to remote entities.
The software and hardware architecture that support outbound authentication take into account the possibility that malicious code may run at root level, and that a corrupt version of the code-loading code may be released. (See our architecture paper [4] for more details.)
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The architecture extends to handle the trust issues introduced by maintenance of lower-level code.
The Retrieval Problem
For this paper, we consider the specific problem of private information retrieval. What does it take to implement a server that provides access to records in a large database, in a way that ensures the complete privacy of this access (and, potentially, the contents of the records themselves)-even to the operator of this server?
We abstract this problem to a real world computer security application, and examine the question: using current commercially available technology, is it practical to build such a server, for real databases of realistic size, that offers reasonable performance?
In a root-secure retrieval scheme, the adversary should not be able to learn what record i was requested in a particular query, nor even learn indirect statistics such as "πi is the most popular record requested" or "users who request πi usually also request πj" (for some permutation π, possibly unknown). For a service with the stronger property of content privacy as well as access privacy, the adversary should also not be able learn the plaintext contents of any particular record. (However, content privacy does have a limit: if the adversary works with an authorized user, then she can learn what that user is authorized to learn).
With root-security, we have that the query, the result, and all statistics should be secure even against traffic analysis and deliberate probing and memory manipulation on the host. However, we are not worrying about denial of service, nor about about hiding the fact that a query took place, nor-in this model-hiding who made the query.
Motivation
We begin by considering some practical motivations for this work.
Access privacy alone would benefit many real-world scenarios:
• Patent Information. Data mining on a competitor's patent searches could shed useful light on their confidential research projects.
• Maps. Oil companies might rather their competitors not know their latest drilling locations.
• Medical Records. Unethical employers might wish to know how often a potential employee's medical records have been accessed-since frequent access might indicate a potentially expensive health problem.
Many other scenarios would benefit from content privacy as well as access privacy. For example:
• Archives of Human Rights Abuses. Suppose the server is seized (or the operator is served with a subpoena or a sufficiently large bribe) by an adversary interested in some particular subset of records.
-The users who worked with those records would benefit if the adversary cannot link a record to them.
-Furthermore, activists in a particular human rights case would benefit if the adversary can neither read any records relevant to that case, nor even learn if any such records exist in the system.
• "Privacy Act" Databases. Root-secure access privacy and content privacy would benefit applications with large amounts of personally identifiable information, where the entity administering the application has strong motivation to suppress insider abuse.
For example, consider a tax authority, where auditors (with special authorization) can examine the tax records of specific individuals.
-Root-secure access privacy would ensure that even root on the server cannot know who is being audited.
-Root-secure content privacy would ensure that even root on the server cannot reveal individual records without authorization.
• "Vegetarian" Data Exchanges. If a data exchange service ensures privacy of access and contents even from the server operator with full "root" privileges, then it can arguably also ensure privacy from wiretapping/analysis device, such as the FBI's Carnivore too; (e.g., [8] ) the operator may be compelled to install.
• Private File Exchange Services. A group wishing to set up a private file exchange service might prefer to honestly say they do not know which of their users has been accessing pirated MP3 files-or even if there are any MP3 files, pirated or not, in the service. (We discuss the legal and ethical implications-and some ideas for addressing them-in Section 5.3.)
Furthermore, we note that variations where users may update records needs content privacy-for otherwise, root would know which record the user touched, because it could see the changed plaintext. (Similarly, a system that allows update would require re-encryption of all records, to prevent root from extracting information from observing which ciphertext changed.)
Previous Work
Previous research has explored related questions.
Private Information Retrieval (PIR) Previous theoretical work (e.g., [9, 10] ) has explored coding techniques by which a user can hide his queries from a distributed database. In this paper, we aren't are interested as much in the abstract problem but in its practicality: can we actually implement this with existing technology, and for realistic databases, and provide reasonable performance? This motivation provides us with goals that (for now) take us away from the focus of the earlier work. Such goals include:
• minimizing user computation (since no one wants to change their client too much);
• minimizing user-server traffic (since, for remote users, that's expensive);
• efficiently handling lots of queries at once;
• parallelizing well (so that throwing more hardware at it speeds things up); and
• using algorithms that depend on computation (such as streaming encryption) that our special-purpose technology can do quickly.
(However, we revisit these issues in Section 5.2.)
Oblivious RAM Previous theoretical work on oblivious RAM (e.g., [11] ) addresses how to prevent instruction fetches from leaking execution details-but explicitly dismissed secure coprocessors as "infeasible."
Secure File Systems Previous work in secure file systems (e.g., [12] ) and cryptopaging (e.g., [3] ) protects database privacy against theft, but not against a malicious root. (Indeed, [13] inquired about how adversaries might learn internal operational details from observing cryptopaging details.)
Anonymizers Previous work in anonymizers (e.g., [14] ) protects the privacy of who is taking some action. Rootsecurity addresses the complementary problem of protecting what the action is.
Mobile Agents
The implementation and use of mobile agents as a model for distributed information services is an another area of complementary research (e.g., [15, 16] ) that suggests several areas for future work: both in exploring our server privacy techniques to protect agent privacy, as well as in extending our techniques to provide privacy when server action handles requests not via a local database query, but via dispatch of an agent.
This Paper
As Section 1.1 introduced, we're interested in how a server operator of otherwise unknown credibility might practically provide a root-secure retrieval service, using current secure coprocessing technology.
Section 2 presents this version of the retrieval problem, and derives the theoretical optimal efficiency for this model. Section 3 presents two algorithms: a straightforward one that neither scales nor parallelizes well, and a more subtle one that does (and achieves this theoretical optimal efficiency). Section 4 presents the current status of our efforts to use these ideas to build a real prototype of a complete privacy server system. Section 5 concludes with avenues for future work.
Retrieval using Secure Coprocessors

Design Challenges
As noted, we consider this problem in the light of secure coprocessors that have recently become available-which provide a safe haven to execute code (and carry out high-speed symmetric cryptography). Theoretical work on oblivious RAM [11] observed that selling "physically protected special-purpose computers for each task" would enable 'trivial" but "infeasible" solutions to problems in securing computation. However, subsequent secure coprocessor research has advanced the state of the art: hardware solutions are now feasible-but not quite trivial.
Because of these advances in secure coprocessing technology, it is now feasible (on a hardware level) for any researcher with a few US$10K of funds to build a private information server by taking a host machine with ample PCI slots, and inserting these coprocessors.
However, building a practical server using these devices creates a challenge: how to provide reasonable performance for databases typically much, much bigger than the internal memory of these devices. We not only want to be handle any one query in a reasonable time; we also want to be able to scale easily in the number of queries, and to exploit the parallelism offered by multiple devices.
Retrieval in this Model
System Assumptions We abstract the specific problem of coprocessor-based information retrieval to the following model. (We consider the most general case: a server that hides both access and content from its operator.)
A single server has a number of secure coprocessors, and provides a query service for a number of records. Each record is stored as a whole unit on some suitable high-performance (but not necessarily secure) media, outside of the coprocessors. The stored records are encrypted and authenticated (see the discussion of E and D below). Figure 1 sketches this architecture.
We assume a secure coprocessor model based on the commercially available device: where the symmetric encryption engine can be configured in series with FIFOs, and thus the time complexity for encryption/decryption (and verification) can be modeled solely by the per-byte data transit rate.
Parameters Formally, we describe the problem with the following parameters:
• The server has RecNum records, R 1 , ..., R RecNum .
• Each record is padded out to some maximum RecSize bytes.
• The server has CardNum coprocessors, C 1 , ...C CardNum . (We assume C 1 is designated as the master coprocessor for the server.)
• Internal coprocessor data memory has size CardSize bytes. We assume that
RecNum · RecSize >> CardNum · CardSize (and it may very well be the case that even RecSize > CardSize ).
• The server has received requests for QueryNum queries.
frag replacements Figure 1 System architecture for coprocessor-based retrieval: a host stores RecNum encrypted and authenticated records of size RecSize each, but has CardNum secure coprocessors (with internal memory CardSize ) to assist in private retrieval. However, RecNum · RecSize >> CardNum · CardSize : the database is much larger than the collective space of the coprocessors.
Cryptography Let E and D be authenticated encryption and decryption functions (respectively) based on a suitably secure symmetric cipher. For example:
• E might consist of appending a keyed MAC (such as SHA-HMAC) then encrypting the result using outer-CBC TDES. D consists of decrypting, then verifying the hash or MAC. (Using a keyed MAC instead of a hash function frees us from potential attacks, should the encryption function be non-malleable.)
• E and D might instead consist of TDES using recent advances [17] in serial (or even parallelizable) chaining that provides authentication as well.
Throughout Section 2 and Section 3, "encryption" and "decryption" refer to operations with E and D, respectively.
(If the service did not provide content privacy, then we would need to separate integrity checking from encryption, and-assuming that just doing an integrity check is cheaper-use just the former on the stored records.)
The Problem We can think of a query Q as a pair (i, K) of record index and session key. A user communicates a query to the master coprocessor C 1 . After some degree of computation, the server returns E K (R i ) to the user: that is, the desired record, encrypted under the specified session key K. In the general case, the server with its coprocessors needs to be able to handle up to QueryNum queries simultaneously.
Parameters in Previous Work
Previous work in private information retrieval usually characterizes the problem in terms of a database of n bytes, with k servers (who usually are assumed not to talk each other). In those terms, n = RecNum · RecSize , but k = 1, since we only have one server. Furthermore, since we want this to be practical and practical users do not like to do extra work, we want to restrict the user's computation to the above two steps: establishing a session key and record number, and then receiving and decrypting the desired record.
Theoretical Lower Bound
In our initial analysis, we permit the system the luxury of accepting and processing the queries as a batch, but nevertheless follow the above storage model in which no information is cached inside the coprocessors across more than one batch.
In any root-secure algorithm for this model, each byte in each encrypted record must be read by at least one coprocessor when answering the set of QueryNum queries. (Otherwise, if part of some R i was not read, then the adversary would know that R i was not one of the requested records.) Thus, any algorithm meeting these conditions must process RecNum · RecSize byte through the symmetric cipher.
Furthermore, each of the requested records must be re-encrypted for the requestors. This is an additional QueryNum · RecSize bytes.
Since the bytes can be processed across CardNum coprocessors, and we are assuming that the coprocessor time complexity can be modeled by simple data transit rate, we have that any algorithm satisfying these conditions must have asymptotic time complexity bounded below by:
Algorithms
To simplify exposition, we start with a straightforward but inefficient algorithm for coprocessor-based retrieval, (Section 3.1), and then move to the asymptotically optimal one (Section 3.2).
Straightforward but Inefficient
We begin by considering the most straightforward algorithm:
• each record R i is stored encrypted as a separate ciphertext E(R i ) (computed using secret keys by the coprocessors but not by the host, obviously)
• the coprocessor just streams in the entire database, looking for the correct record.
However, problems arise here when one tries handle more queries, or divide the work among multiple devices. Figure 2 illustrates this approach.
An Easy Case
To start with, let us consider an easy case:
• QueryNum = 1
• CardNum = 1.
• RecSize ≤ CardSize 2 .
To handle query Q 1 = (i 1 , K 1 ), one coprocessor can simply follow the following the algorithm:
• For 1 ≤ i ≤ RecNum , have each E(R i ) streamed in through the symmetric engine.
• If i = i 1 , then save these bytes in internal memory.
• If i = i 1 , then throw them away (but take the same amount of time as it would to save them). The CardSize 2 assumption on record size means that, even if the architecture does not support anything more clever, we can always just bring the uninteresting records into a dummy buffer.
• When all RecNum records have been processed, then R i is in internal DRAM; stream back out through the symmetric engine, encrypting under K 1 .
Since our system model assumes encryption/decryption hardware in series with device FIFOs, this straightforward case requires transfering RecNum · RecSize bytes in, then sending RecSize back out.
Thus, this straightforward handling of this easy case takes time O( RecNum · RecSize ): so far, so good.
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. . . Figure 2 In the straightforward algorithm, each coprocessor looks at 1 CardNum of the records. However, this does not scale well, since each coprocessor outputs QueryNum records, and we still need to select QueryNum of these QueryNum · CardNum .
More Coprocessors When CardNum > 1, then each coprocessor can scan CardNum of the records. However, we then have a problem. Only one of these coprocessors has the right answer. But if, for some j, we don't read RecSize bytes from coprocessor C j , then the adversary will know that the queried record is not in the jth 1 CardNum of the records.
Consequently, we need to break the algorithm into two steps:
• the streaming phase, where each coprocessor reads in its share of the encrypted records, then outputs either the encrypted answer or encrypted nonsense (where these are encrypted with some intermediate set of keys);
• then the combination phase, where we must combine this partial result by selecting one of these CardNum records in a root-secure way.
This straightforward approach to this harder case yields
Bigger Records During the streaming phase, a coprocessor needs to consider two records: the current candidate, and a place-holder for the correct record. When CardSize was big enough, the coprocessor could store the placeholder internally, and still have room to bring in each candidate one at a time. As a consequence, each step of "stream in a record" required one transfer of RecSize bytes, through the decryption engine and into the card.
However, if RecSize > CardSize , then the place-holder must be stored in externally, instead of in the card. Furthermore, the coprocessor had better read and rewrite this place-holder at each step; otherwise, it will reveal the identity of the record of interest. Hence, in addition to the transfer of RecSize bytes to bring in the record of interest, we must bring in the RecSize bytes of the current place-holder, and then send RecSize bytes back out when we re-write it.
Thus, the constant on RecSize goes up to three. (Again, recall that in our system model, the encryption/decryption engine can be configured in series with the transfer FIFOs.)
More Queries When we consider the fully general case (with QueryNum > 1), we run into complications.
During the initial streaming phrase, each coprocessor, in order to process its RecNum CardNum records for QueryNum queries, must either go through the records QueryNum times, or go through them once but process QueryNum cached copies at each step (or some combination thereof). During the streaming phase, each coprocessor thus ends up
During the combination phase, we then need to select QueryNum of QueryNum · CardNum records. This appears to take at least QueryNum · CardNum · RecSize bytes.
Thus, the straightforward approach to the fully general case yields suboptimal complexity of
. . . . . . . . .
. . . Figure 3 We obtain much better efficiency and scaling by dividing each record into BuckNum stripes, and having each coprocessor look at a bucket B i of stripes-one from each record-at a time. With this approach to streaming, the combination phase becomes trivial-since no causality needs to be broken.
Subtle, with Optimal Efficiency
We now present a more efficient algorithm, and start immediately with the general case:
General Idea Upon analysis, the straightforward approach to the fully general case is slow for two reasons:
• In the streaming phase, because RecSize > CardSize , each coprocessor must handle QueryNum · RecSize bytes 3 times for each record.
• In the combination phase, because any one coprocessor could potentially have all QueryNum records, we need to look at all QueryNum · RecSize bytes from each coprocessor, in order to break any potential causality.
To overcome these problems, we developed an alternate way to subdivide the records so that:
• During the streaming phase, each record is small enough so that essentially QueryNum · RecSize ≤ CardSize , so each coprocessor need only handle ( QueryNum + RecNum ) · RecSize bytes.
• During the combination phase, no causality need to be broken-so at worst, this only requires re-encryption of the QueryNum · RecSize bytes to be returned to the users.
Striped Data
The key to obtaining this efficiency to abandoning the idea of storing and processing data as whole records.
Instead, we divide each record into stripes of size StripeSize bytes.
Let StripeSize ≤ CardSize QueryNum , so QueryNum stripes fit inside one coprocessor. Instead of storing and processing the records as a sequence of whole records, we organize them as a sequence of buckets of stripes. The ith bucket consists of the ith stripe (that is, the ith StripeSize bytes) of each record. (See Figure 3 .)
The Streaming Phase As with the easy case in Section 3.1 above, each coprocessor handles a bucket by streaming it in one stripe at a time. If the stripe belongs to a record that is being queried, then the coprocessor saves it in internal memory; otherwise, the coprocessor discards it. (However, this operation must be coded so that both options take the same time: otherwise, an adversary could observe the difference.) When the bucket is done, the coprocessor has QueryNum stripes in its memory; it re-encrypts each with an appropriate key and outputs them. Thus, the time per bucket is ( RecNum + QueryNum ) · StripeSize .
Since the total number of buckets is RecSize
StripeSize and each coprocessor handles CardNum of the buckets, this gives a net cost for the streaming phase of
Notice that not only is this the asymptotic optimum for this model, but we also have a constant of one: if we model coprocessor performance by data transfer rate through the engine, then we need only multiply the above by the engine's time-per-byte to get a time estimate for this streaming phase.
The Combination Phase However, a significant advantage of striping is that the combination phase becomes very simple, since there is no potential causality to break. In the earlier whole-record algorithm, if the adversary can observe whether or not a query result came from the output of a particular coprocessor after the streaming phase, then the adversary can learn whether nor that requested record was in that coprocessor's 1 CardNum of the records. But in this striping algorithm now, the adversary already knows that, after a given coprocessor processes a given bucket B i , this coprocessor will spit out the ith stripe of each requested record-and this does not help, since the bucket the coprocessor examined contained the ith stripe of every record.
In the striping algorithm, at the end of the streaming phase, coprocessor C j has output the jth Either leaves the asymptotic cost of the striping algorithm at the theoretical optimum:
Building a Private Server System
Our motivation in exploring these issues was to determine a practical solution to these privacy problems, using current technology. Our ultimate goal is a complete working system, with reasonable performance, and a complete blueprint to enable anyone (such as these "server operators of unknown credibility" that we allude to) to repeat this work.
This section presents the current status of this work: Section 4.1, the basic service prototype; Section 4.2, the rest of the system.
Basic Service Prototype
Current Prototype
We have implemented a basic prototype of the striping approach. The host-side code runs on Linux platforms, and handles an arbitrary number of coprocessors by launching a separate thread to handle each one. The card-side code runs in the application layer on standard production IBM 4758-002/23 devices. (This means the card-side code confines itself to the standard CP/Q++ system software provided with the 4758; as noted below, we believe significant performance improvement will be possible with modifications to kernel-level code in the card.) In between, we built a framework that allows (via compile-time options) the host-side code to either work directly with real cards, or simulates a number of cards and has the host work with them.
To date, we have validated this prototype running it with one real card, and with larger numbers of simulated cards.
(More work is in progress, as noted below.)
Error Detection and Active Attacks Section 3 focused primarily on using symmetric cryptography, for secrecy of records against a passive adversary. The realities of accommodating storage/transmission errors-and an active adversary who might deliberately tamper with data-required that we also consider using redundancy of some type to detect and suppress such errors-as Section 2.2 noted.
One issue we needed to consider was who should respond to an authentication error, and how; the answers are relevant to preserving privacy.
• If each coprocessor detects and responds to errors on a bucket granularity (independent of whether or not the error was in an interesting stripe), then an active adversary can learn nothing, even in a coalition with users.
• If the user then detects an error, he can request retransmission of the post-coprocessor output without revealing which record he was interested in-because if the adversary had introduced an error on the way into the coprocessor, the coprocessor would have detected it.
How to structure this redundancy and how to check are not issues for asymptotic complexity, but are for practical performance.
In our initial prototype, we used outer-CBC TDES as the symmetric cipher, and SHA-1 on the plaintext for redundancy.
Basic Approach
In an idealized implementation, the card-side CPU just brings in stripes, and saves or discards them. In our initial prototype, we had to work with the generic CP/Q++, which only lets the card-side application do data transfer and cryptography through a fairly limited API (which did not support this ideal vision). Furthermore, as previous work [7] shows, the CP/Q++ system has a per-request cost that penalizes multiple small requests.
Given these constraints, our prototype card-side code allocates an internal DRAM buffer that can accommodate an entire stripeset, brings a stripeset in at once (through TDES), checks the SHA on each stripe, then saves (and reencrypts, internally) the interesting stripes in an internal output buffer. (Doing a hash on each stripe saves us the trouble of recomputing it when we do the re-encryption.) When the buffer is full, it blasts the contents back out to the host.
Our prototype also supports asynchronous requests. The model of Section 2.2 implicitly assumed that all QueryNum queries show up at the same time. In reality, they may show up at different times. Since, essentially, the coprocessors are just cycling through the data and there is no natural reason why any particular record is denoted as R 1 .
Performance Issues
As long as the number of simultaneous queries are a small fraction of the number of records, our model suggests that the turnaround time for each query is approximately the time it takes to send each byte in the entire database into some card in the card farm (doing symmetric crypto and integrity checking).
The good news is that our prototype confirmed this.
The bad news is that our bytes-per-second-per-card figure was in the 600−800 kilobytes/second range-disappointing for a device whose TDES engine can exceed 18 megabytes/second! The card's TDES engine supports doing TDES and SHA in series. If we could exploit this, we could bring the transfer speed up to 1.2 megabytes/second/card. The advertised API does not officially support this operation (but we may be able to exploit an unofficial mechanism by having our application bypass the official library and send a message directly to the CP/Q++ module in charge of the TDES/SHA engine). From our previous work [7] with performance optimization for this device, we speculate that the main bottleneck here is DMA between the TDES engine and the card's internal RAM. It is interesting to note that in our prototype, bringing in the data via DES, or TDES, or no encryption at all made no difference in the transfer time, supporting the hypothesis.
To summarize: our prototype established that the scheme works, and that the limiting factor for performance is the transfer/encryption rate of the native hardware. Since the hardware is rated over 25 times faster what we measured, however, we are optimistic that we can remove this bottleneck. In some sense, our work is hindered by the fact that the COTS hardware was not designed for this "external-to-internal-to-external" processing that this application requires.
Next Steps
The most significant next step is to improve this per-card performance. Modifying kernel-level code in the card to allow the CPU to directly pull bytes from the TDES engine via PIO, to do SHA in serial should significantly improve performance. (Our earlier optimization work yielded a factor of 1000 improvement, but from a worse starting point; here, we anticipate a factor of 10.)
This kernel-level approach would also free us from having to allocate an internal DRAM buffer for a stripeset, allowing us to accommodate larger stripesets and fewer flushes of the output buffer.
We also want to run the prototype with larger numbers of real cards. We note that the PCI bus is rated in excess of 130 megabytes/second, so (in theory) it should not be a bottleneck for any reasonable number of cards in a host. Furthermore, many new servers have multiple sets of PCI buses.
Projected Performance To make things concrete, let's assume we have a five-card set-up, and consider two datasets: 1000 5-kilobyte web pages, and 1000 5-megabyte MP3 files. (Let's also assume that QueryNum < RecNum We note that, in the projected case, we could service 1000 5-gigabyte movies in about 31 hours (which is less than the typical download time).
Database Structure The coprocessors need to access host-side data. However, once records are arranged in encrypted stripe-sets, the host-side transfer overhead should be no different from the straighforward scheme. (However, structuring the database to minimize the re-structuring cost when coprocessors are added or removed is an open question.)
Additional Features
We are also considering a number of additional features for future versions.
Reducing Storage We (and others) normalize all record lengths to a maximum RecSize not just because it makes analysis easier, but because otherwise the adversary could deduce query information based on size of encrypted record. But this normalization leads to much wasted space and time, since short records much be padded out. While it appears inevitable that the encrypted response to any given query must be RecSize bytes, we could reduce a lot of storage and processing time in the striping algorithm-if we don't mind giving away some information about the distribution of record sizes in the database-by not padding the stored records. (That is, coprocessors might read in shorter buckets, and still output QueryNum · StripeSize bytes.) If UnpaddedSize is net size of all the unpadded records, then the time complexity would go down to
(That is, RecNum · RecSize goes down to UnpaddedSize .)
Private Information Storage So far, we have dealt exclusively with retrieving records. The algorithm ought to extend easily to modify records as well: however, each "examine a stripeset" would also need to re-encrypt the stripeset, to keep the host from learning which stripes were changed. This continual re-encryption suggests non-trivial freshness, key management, and host-storage issues, and the extra transfers would reduce performance.
Anonymization As noted in Section 1.3.2, this paper addresses a problem that is complementary to the problem of hiding user identities. It would be interesting to combine our work with a CROWDS-like anonymity scheme, to provide privacy for the entire interaction.
Additional Server Computation
The coprocessor approach provides a trusted computational entity with full knowledge of user activity. As Section 5.3 notes, this fact may provide promising ways to address other problems that appear much more awkward in non-coprocessor cryptographic techniques. For example:
• providing flexible key recovery schemes;
• preserving privacy of user actions while providing atomicity against various failures;
• balancing privacy with marketing services-e.g., the coprocessor could track a user's purchases and offer him or her special deals based on these patterns, but this information would be hidden from root.
The Rest of the System
Performance Issues for Host Our initial prototype focused on demonstrating that the data structures and ideas worked. Our next steps will focus on improving the card performance.
However, to show that a complete working system is possible, we also need to demonstrate that a real host can feed its cards quickly enough.
Integration with Web Server For a server operator to offer this service in the real world, remote clients with legacy browsers need a root-secure way to interact with the system. In our related WebALPS project [1, 2] , we are modifying legacy Web servers to permit remote clients to establish certain SSL sessions directly with an entity inside a coprocessor. This work handles that piece-and also enables many other exciting avenues to enhance security and privacy of Web interactions.
Proving the Privacy
The final element of making this system practical is enabling a server operator of otherwise unknown credibility prove that her service really has root-secure privacy.
Our security architecture and outbound authentication support for the 4758 enables an on-card application (from an officially sanctioned developer) to:
• request generation of keypairs certified to belong to that application, in that configuration, in that untampered card
• and then to access private-key services for these keypairs.
Once an officially sanctioned vendor releases WebALPS and privacy server code, this technology will enable the WebALPS guardian at the server site to prove that's a bona fide front end to a bona fide privacy server-and also enable authentication and key management between the various cards in the server farm.
Future Work
This paper presents a snapshot of one aspect of research that is ongoing.
Performance
The primary avenue of future work is to address the rest of performance, feature, and system issues from Section 4.
As noted above, the major barrier to reasonable performance of this scheme for large record sizes is the limitations imposed by the the production-level COTS devices: the components support sufficiently fast transfer and encryption, but the configuration and firmware (as shipped) do not. In the short term, we plan to try rewriting the kernel-level drivers inside the coprocessor. But in the long term, these issues would vanish entirely with a new hardware design around the existing encryption engines.
Experimental Evaluation of Theoretical PIR Schemes
In this paper, we presented an algorithm that is linear in the total size of the database, but which meets our practicality goals (and is "linear" with a small constant, in computation at which these devices are quick).
However, there exists a number of theoretical results for various other settings of this PIR problem. It would be very interesting to explore implementing these in this client-server-coprocessor framework.
For example, prior work in single-server PIR might directly fit our framework, with the coprocessor functioning as a proxy for the PIR's user and the host functioning as the PIR server. Furthemore, our striped-bucket approach should extend to add parallelization to these more complex schemes (e.g., we replace the streaming phase with an instance of PIR on smaller records). However, it's not clear how quickly the special purpose devices could carry out this work, or whether things would scale well to more queries, and parallelize well with more coprocessors. These are all interesting areas for exploration and experiment.
Ethical and Legal Implications
Building and deploying a root-secure database service raises some potential ethical issues. For a timely example, it would enable someone to set up a service that allows users to download MP3 compressions of recorded songs, while making it impossible for recording artists to determine which of these downloads violated copyright laws.
One might characterize solutions to such problems as selective weakening of root security. For example, the community in the above scenario might decide that an acceptable arrangement is that the service provider pay royalties for the frequency of access to copyrighted songs, and in turn prohibit users from downloading more than some maximum number of these in any given one-week period.
Our use of secure coprocessors to provide full root-security provides an interesting avenue to implement such selective weakenings: since we already have trusted third parties (the coprocessors) with full plaintext access, we can implement such policy solutions as computation alone, instead of via more complex cryptographic schemes that change with each new policy.
Broader Research Issues
As noted in Section 1.1, privacy of retrieval was just one sample problem. We are interested in the broader issue of how to improve security and privacy of distributed information services, in practical ways with minimal deviation from the current infrastructure. As part of the newly established Dartmouth PKILab, we are currently exploring a number of areas, using coprocessors (e.g., the WebALPS project) and other techniques.
Conclusion
From this analysis, we conclude that practical private information indeed appears feasible with commercially available secure coprocessor technology.
In some sense, what we are doing is extending the limits of secure coprocessing. Secure coprocessors provide-if the physical security assumptions hold-a haven where details of internal computation are hidden even from a dedicated adversary. In this paper, we have explored (for a sample problem) how to preserve this property while extending the file system to the host and the computation across several coprocessors. One wonders at the implications of more general "secure multi-processing."
